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'
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IV
Plaintiff contends in Point IV of Respondent's
brief that the amount which the jury awarded to plaintiffs as special damages over and above medical expenses
should be added to the jury award for general damages.
Defendant respectfully submits that the facts and the
law do not support such a contention.
1

The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict
was returned awarding plaintiff $32,500.00 in general
damages and $17,500.00 in special damages ('T. 319).
The court noted to both parties that the special damages
exceeded the limit it had placed on the jury of $3,424.H
which limit was contained in the jury instruction number 6 ( T. 21). The court suggested that the error could
be corrected by motion and to that both parties agreed
(T. 319, 320).
The court then asked both parties whether either
of them had any objection to the discharge of the jury.
Neither party objected and the jury was discharged
(T. 320).
A motion was made by defendant that the verdict
as to special damages be amended to conform to the
special damages pleaded and stated in the jury instructions ( T. 320) .
Plaintiff thereafter moved that the pleaded special
damages as reflected in jury instruction number 6 be
amended by increasing it by $400.00 to include the cost
of a future medical procedure testified to during trial.
The addition of this sum brought the special damage
figure pleaded and stated in the jury instructions to
$3,824.44, and defendant stated that it had no objection
to this amendment (T. 320, 321).
The verdict as to special damages was then amended
from $17 ,500.00 to $3,824.44. Thereafter the following
exchange took place between the Court and counsel:
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"THE COURT: Then I will amend by interlineation the special damage figure to
$3,824.44.

MR. KIPP: 'Ve make no objection to that.

THE COURT: The verdict may be filed.

MIL CHILD: Showing a total verdict of what,
then, your Honor?

THE COURT: $32,500.00 plus $3,824.44.
MR. KIPP: Correct.
THE COURT: Anything further for the present time, counsel?
l\IR. KIPP: 'Ve have nothing further, your
Honor." (T. 321).
Subsequently, plaintiff made a motion to reform the
yerdict by adding the sum of $13,675.56 to general damages ( R. 27) ; this motion was denied by the trial court
(R. 30).

Plaintiff is apparently contending that it was the
intent of the jury to award plaintiff an additional
$13,675.56 in general damages. Obviously, at this point
it is impossible to tell what the intent of the jury may
have been.
Rule 47 (r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
nrovides
for the correction of an insufficient or incorrect
•
jury verdict:
"Correction of Verdict. If the verdict rendered is
informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury
may lJC .:crzt out ayain." (Emphasis added.)
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After the jury verdict was returned, defendant not
only failed to request that the court apply the provisions
of Rule 47 ( r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but
also agreed to the dismissal of the jury without so much
as even raising the issue of an increase in general damages. Instead plaintiff stipulated that the correct verdict
was $32,500.00 in general damages and $3,824.44 in
special damages ( T. 321).
In the case of Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d
330, 383 P.2d 934 (1963), the jury brought back averdict for plaintiff in the amount of $368.49 in special
damages and $1,131.51 in general damages. The odd
amounts prompted the court to question the jury foreman about the possibility of a quotient or chance verdict. Under such questioning it was revealed that the
jury had improperly considered one element of general
damages. Thereupon, the court instructed the jury to
go out and reconsider its verdict. The jury returned
with a different verdict for general damages. This court
held that such a course of action was not only within the
prerogative of the trial court under Rule 47 ( r), but entirely proper and discreetly handled.
The case of Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472
P .2d 942 ( 1970) , involved an issue almost identical to
the one presented before this court. In that case the court
instructed the jury that special damages could not exceed $377.50. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000.00
for special damages. When the court saw the obvious
error, it gave further directions to the jury and sent it
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back out to redeliberate. The jury returned with a verdict of $11,322.50 in general damages and $377.50 in
special damages. This court held that this was a proper
procedure under Rule 47 (r) .
Plaintiff was free in the case at bar to request that
the trial court send the jury back to redeliberate in accordance with Rule 47 ( r) of the U tab Rules of Civil
Procedure. Instead the plaintiff chose to reduce the special damages by stipulation and to have the jury discharged. The failure to make such a request while the
jury was still impaneled prevents plaintiff from now
objecting to the insufficiency of the verdict. The trial
court judge could not nor can this court know now what
might have been the intent of the jury.

A number of courts have held that a party who fails
to object to the irregularity of the verdict at the time it is
returned is thereby precluded from claiming error in
the verdict.
In Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal. 2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063
(1938) the Supreme Court of California in considering
a verdict which could have been corrected by the jury,
stated:
" ... The proper procedure where an informal or
insufficient verdict has been returned is for the
trial court to require the jury to return for further deliberation. Kerrison v. Unger, 135 Cal.
App. 607, 611, 27 P.2d 927. There can be no
doubt, in view of the record presented on appeal,
that had the jury been required by the trial court
to retire for further deliberation under proper
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instructions, a proper verdict would have been
returned. It is well established by numerous authorities that, when a verdict is not in proper
form and the jury is not required to clarify it,
any error in said verdict is waived by the party
relying thereon who at the time of its rendition
failed to make any request that its formality or
uncertainty be corrected . ... " Brown at 1065,
1066. (Emphasis added.)
In Hamilton v. Wrang, 221 A.2d 605 (Del. 1966),
an action for personal injuries and property damages
arising out of an automobile accident, the jury verdict
was for car damages only. On appeal, plaintiff stated
that the verdict was void because it failed to award damages to plaintiff in a stated amount. It appeared that
during the trial the parties had stipulated that the
amount of damages to the car was $511.00. The plaintiff made no objection to the form of the verdict at the
time it was announced and the jury was thereafter discharged. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the
lower court decision upholding the jury verdict stating:
"The failure of the plaintiffs to object to the form
of the verdict is fatal to their contention in this
appeal that it is a nullity because of its allegedly
defective form. It is necessary in order to take
advantage of a supposed defect in the form of a
verdict that the aggrieved party take exception
to it prior to the discharge of the jury, and the
failure to do so amounts to a waiver of the point.
[citation] The reason for the rule is that upo?
timely objection the trial judge prior to the jurys
discharge can instruct it to correct a faulty ver·
diet." Hamilton at G06. (Emphasis added.)
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In a motion to reform the verdict, plaintiff had a
hearing before the trial court on this very question.
There plaintiff had an opportunity to present his arguments and have the court consider them. After so doing,
this motion was denied.
As plaintiff pointed out in Point I of his brief, there
is a presumption of validity on appeal of the judgment
and proceedings in the trial court. This being the case it
must be presumed that the judgment which was rendered
in the trial court and agreed to by plaintiff is correct.
The case of Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391
P.2d 430 ( 1964), cited by the plaintiff states that the
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate some persuasive reason for upsetting the judgment. Since plaintiff cites no authority for his Point IV, it must be presumed that he has not met the burden placed upon him.
To the contrary, it would appear that the weight of
authority forbids the court to increase the amount of a
jury verdict:
"As a general rule where the determination of
the amount of recovery is exclusively within the
province of the jury, the court has no power to
amend the verdict by increasing the amount
found by the jury; * * *" 89 C.J.S., Trial, Section 517 (1955).
Finally, plaintiff claims that it is clear that the jury
intended this to be compensation for lost income. It is
submitted that it is not at all clear that the figure of
~13,675.56 represents what the jury intended to be
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awarded for lost income. It is to be noted that the figure
itself is a most curious amount which does not correlate
to any evidence or amounts that were presented at trial.
It is further to be noted that plaintiff's complaint only ,
prayed for lost income in the approximate sum of
$7,000.00. The figure now being sought is almost double
the amount for which plaintiff prayed. In short, it is impossible to know at this point what, if anything, the
figure of $13,675.56 represented to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
RAMON M. CHILD, ESQ.
M. JOHN ASHTON, ESQ.
400 Deseret Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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